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Abstract 
Multi-agent systems (MAS) open new modelling and analysis perspectives in ecological 
and social sciences. An original characteristic of the Companion Modelling (ComMod) 
approach adopted in this case study is the co-construction and use of a MAS model with and 
for local stakeholders such as farmers and local administrators. Alternating iteratively field 
and modelling activities, this approach facilitates collective learning among local stakeholders 
and between them and the researchers. Combining the use of MAS models with Role-Playing 
Games (RPG), the described experiment aimed to facilitate collective decision-making in a 
socially heterogeneous community of small farmers in mountainous northern Thailand about 
the local rules for the allocation of rural credit to allow a more equitable and extensive 
process of expansion of non-erosive perennial crops in a watershed prone to erosion. This 
paper presents the MAS model and the results of a series of simulations exploring the 
ecological, social and economic effects of various rules for formal and informal credit 
suggested by the villagers-participants. Six scenarios considered as pertinent to further 
explore the participants’ suggestions were defined based on different combinations among the 
following three variables: (i) Duration for the reimbursement of loans, (ii) Mode of allocation 
of formal credit among three different types of farms, (iii) Configuration of networks of 
acquaintances for access to informal credit. 
Drawing on this case study, we first elaborate on the potential of bottom-up models such as 
MAS to analyze the functioning of agricultural systems, in particular farm differentiation and 
rural credit dynamics. We highlight the ability of MAS to deal with interactions between 
social and ecological dynamics and to take into account social interactions, in particular the 
concept of social capital which is a determining factor when dealing with sustainability issues. 
The second question addressed in this paper deals with the potential and limits of MAS 
models to support a bottom-up (or participatory) modelling approach. This experiment 
suggests that the usefulness of models relies much more on the modelling process than on the 
model itself, because a model is usually useless if it is misunderstood by its potential users, or 
if it does not respond to their current preoccupations. The intuitive representation of real 
systems provided by MAS and their high flexibility are the two underlined characteristics 
favouring their appropriation by local stakeholders.  
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Introduction 
Thanks to advances in the field of distributed artificial intelligence, multi-agents systems 
(MAS) can now be used to run simulations of social phenomena based on their computerized 
representations, and to apply new types of experimental methods in social sciences (Axelrod 
1997, Gilbert and Troitzsch 1999, Janssen and De Vries 1998, Moss and Edmunds 2005). A 
MAS can be defined as a collection of autonomous entities interacting with each other and 
with their environment (Ferber 1999). Contrary to traditional modelling techniques, MAS are 
not expressed in terms of variables, functions and equations, but in terms of agents, objects 
and environment. In addition to providing a natural and intuitive description of a system, they 
can capture emergent phenomena resulting from the interactions of individual entities. This is 
why they are sometimes called “bottom-up” models (Boulanger and Bréchet, 2005, p 344) 
and are closely linked to the concept of complex systems.  
In the field of economy, MAS provide an alternative to classical economic thinking 
(Arthur 1991, Arthur et al. 1997, Jager et al. 2000, Kirman 1999, Rouchier and Bousquet 
1998, Tesfatsion and Judd, 2006). In conventional economic theories, the behaviour of a 
group of individuals is represented by a single average meta-actor. General interest is seen as 
the sum of individual interests. Moreover, individuals’ behaviours are formalised following a 
rational-actor approach, i.e. as Homo economicus which are self-regarding individuals 
maximising their own well-being with unlimited cognitive resources. While these traditional 
economic models have proven their usefulness in many situations, the above-cited authors 
argue that these models fail to capture some important nuances of reality. Instead, the 
behaviour of a group of individuals can be seen as a set of interactions among heterogeneous 
individuals, generating aggregate phenomena that are different from the behaviour of an 
average meta-actor (Kirman 1999). Alternative models of human actors’ behaviours also 
emphasize that actors take decisions with limited cognitive resources, as their perception of 
reality is biased and incomplete, and they are limited in their capacity to predict the future. 
Moreover, human actors are not necessarily self-regarding and isolated (Jager et al, 2000). 
Social dimensions and interactions such as imitation, exchanges of information, mutual aid 
and cooperation can be key factors affecting both micro-level processes and macro-level 
outcomes. MAS are seen as a promising tool to study such alternative economic theories.     
MAS are of particular interests to researchers in the field of renewable resource 
management (Bousquet and Le Page 2004, Lansing and Kremer 1993). Several adapted MAS 
simulation platforms were developed such as Cormas (Bousquet et al. 1998), Netlogo 
(Wilensky 1999), Repast (North et al. 2006) or Swarm (Minar et al. 1996). After comparing 
the strengths and weaknesses of six main families of modelling techniques (such as macro-
econometric models, system dynamics models, Bayesian networks, etc.) to assess 
environmental, economic and social impacts of development policies, Boulanger and Bréchet  
(2005) concluded that MAS was the most promising one to deal with sustainable development 
issues.  
An original characteristic of the Companion Modelling (ComMod) approach adopted 
in this case study is the co-construction of the MAS model with local stakeholders (such as 
farmers and local administrators) and the use of MAS simulations with them to facilitate 
collective learning among them and between them and the researchers (Barreteau et al. 2003, 
Bousquet et al. 1999). Compared to classical modelling processes in which researchers build 
models on their own before presenting them to policy-makers, such an approach is based on 
the assumption that an increased participation of local stakeholders in the construction of 
model dealing with issues affecting them would benefit not only the local stakeholders, but 
also the researchers and the policy-makers. ComMod triggers stakeholder participation by 
adopting an iterative approach alternating field and modelling activities in a cyclical way to 
ensure that the researchers’ assumptions are continuously confronted to the field situation and 
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the feedbacks from the local stakeholders integrated in the model. This approach is used with 
two possible aims: learn on systems or support collective decision processes in these systems. 
In both cases, researchers and local stakeholders iteratively learn from each other through 
interactions mediated by an evolutionary model (Barreteau et al, 2003). ComMod has been 
recently applied in many places in the world (D'Aquino et al. 2003, Etienne 2003) and at a 
dozen sites in Southeast Asia (Bousquet et al. 2005). It often (but not necessarily) combines 
the use of MAS models with Role-Playing Games (RPG) to facilitate local stakeholders’ 
participation and discussions among them, like in this experiment.       
The MAS model presented in this paper was built to facilitate collective decision-
making in a socially heterogeneous community of small farmers in mountainous northern 
Thailand about the local rules for the allocation of rural credit to allow a more equitable and 
extensive process of expansion of non-erosive perennial crops in a watershed prone to erosion 
(Barnaud et al. 2006). This model explores the interrelated roles of formal and informal credit 
and the ecological and socio-economic impacts of various credit rules. Formal credit 
corresponds to institutionalized credit funds whereas informal credit is seen as loans settled 
among villagers, either without interests within networks of acquaintances, or with high 
interest rates when usurers are involved. This case study addresses three of the main 
methodological challenges for models dealing with sustainability issues identified by 
Boulanger and Bréchet3 (2005). First, it requires an interdisciplinary approach to trigger the 
interactions between the ecological dynamics of soil erosion and the socio-economic 
dynamics related to rural credit and farm differentiation. Second, the model adopts a local-
global (or bottom-up) perspective to analyze the effects at the watershed and community 
levels of the farmers’ individual behaviours and of the interactions among them. Third, 
Boulanger and Bréchet (2005) also mention stakeholder participation as a main challenge for 
modelling processes dealing with sustainable development.    
This article is aimed at answering two questions. First, what are the potential and 
limits of bottom-up models such as MAS to explore the functioning of agricultural systems, in 
particular farm differentiation and rural credit dynamics? Second, what are the potential and 
limits of MAS models to support a bottom-up modelling approach, i.e. a participatory 
modelling process in which models are conceived and used with and for local stakeholders? 
Following a description of the study site, the conducted ComMod process and the MAS 
model, we analyze the results of a series of simulations exploring the ecological, social and 
economic effects of various rules for formal and informal credit. The two above mentioned 
questions are then discussed in light of these results. We come back in conclusion to the 
theoretical discussions in the field of economy to highlight which economic theories our 
findings support.  
 
Materials & methods 
A cyclical process combining Multi-Agent Systems with Role Playing Games 
The main successive phases of a ComMod cycle are generally as follows: (i) Characterization 
of the problem, (ii) Modelling, i.e converting existing knowledge into one or several formal 
tools to be used as simulators; and (iii) Simulations to explore various scenarios of solutions. 
In this case study, the ComMod process combined the use of field surveys, individual 
interviews, focused group debates and two types of simulations tools: Role-Playing Games 
(RPG) and Multi-Agent Systems (MAS). In each cycle, the RPG used with the stakeholders is 
a simplified version of the MAS: the agents in the model correspond to the roles in the game, 
                                                 
3 Boulanger and Bréchet (2005) identified five main methodological challenges for models dealing with 
sustainability issues: (i) interdisplinary approach to trigger human-nature interactions, (ii) uncertainty 
management, (iii) long-range view to deal with temporal externalities, (iv) local-global perspective for spatial 
externalities, and (v) stakeholder participation for social externalities.  
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the spatial interface of the model corresponds to the gaming board, the time step of the model 
corresponds to the gaming round, etc. The main difference is that while in the RPG decisions 
are taken by real players, in the MAS the corresponding decision making processes are 
modelled. The game is a way to “open the black box of the model”: it allows the players to 
understand, and therefore criticize and validate the model suggested by the research team 
(Barreteau et al. 2001). The learning process focusing on a problem in a ComMod cycle might 
raise new problems and questions that can be examined in a following cycle with new adapted 
RPG and MAS model. This is what happened in this experiment (figure 1). 
 
 
Figure 1. The iterative companion modelling process alternating field and laboratory 
activities implemented in Mae Salaep village, Chiang Rai Province, northern Thailand. 
Natural Resource Management issues addressed at Mae Salaep study site 
 
In the Akha village of Mae Salaep located in Chiang Rai province, following more than two 
decades of integration in the market economy, the process of commercial diversification 
based on horticultural productions led to an extensive social differentiation among farming 
households with various economic interests and land-use strategies (Trébuil et al. 1997). As 
the traditional rotational system is replaced by a permanent cash cropping-based agriculture, 
the increased risk of soil erosion in the upper catchments perceived by lowlanders threatens 
ethnic minority highlanders with further restrictions regarding their access to farm land. In 
this context, the first implemented ComMod cycle focused on reaching a common 
understanding on the relationship between the risk of soil erosion and crop diversification 
(Trébuil et al. 2002). During this cycle, the villagers validated the agro-ecological aspects of 
the model suggested by the researchers. They discussed and agreed on the need to expand the 
coverage of non-erosive perennial cash crops in the catchment, seeing them as a promising 
solution limiting soil erosion while securing higher and more stable incomes. But the 
participants also pointed to the fact that only the relatively well-off households could 
currently invest in perennial crops. Therefore they requested to implement a second ComMod 
cycle focusing on the socioeconomic dynamics related to the adoption of perennial crops 
(figure 1). In particular, as the possibility to invest in perennial crops is highly dependent on 
access to credit because of the long delay between planting and the first harvests, new rules 
for the allocation of rural credit needed to be found to support the establishment of such 
plantations in resource-poor farmers’ fields (Barnaud et al. 2006a). Later on, as these 
plantations were expanding and requested more and more irrigation water, social tension 
 5
occurred among villagers because of a growing gap between water availability and needs, and 
the participants requested to examine this water problem in a third ComMod cycle (Barnaud 
et al. 2007b). In this article, we focus on the MAS modelling and simulating process 
conducted in the second cycle regarding credit.  
 
Description of the socio-ecological system and the situation regarding credit 
The three main types of farming households in this Akha village differ by their amounts of 
land resources and capital, and subsequent differentiated socio-economic strategies. Type A 
farming households have small market integrated farms, type B medium-sized and 
conservative farms, and type C large farms with diverse commercial productions. 
Compare to annual cash crops such as maize or ginger, perennial crops can provide 
higher and more stable incomes. They also present the advantage of being less labour 
intensive and therefore leaving more time to family labours for off-farm employment, which 
is an important source of income in the area. Two perennial crops dominate in the catchment: 
lychee, a high input and high economic risk crop accessible to only well-off farmers, and the 
more recently introduced green Assam tea, named “the poor man’s perennial crop”. With no 
external input required, a shorter duration from planting to first pickings, and more stable 
farm gate prices, Assam tea is accessible to a broader range of villagers, but not all of them 
yet because of a lack of access to appropriate credit. 
The situation regarding credit can be summarized as follows. Formal and informal 
credit systems co-exist in the village. Concerning formal credit, besides a village fund 
providing small loans with average interest rates, a government fund providing larger sums, 
and without interests, was launched in 2002. But this profitable source of credit is currently 
only accessible to well-off households because they are the only ones who can reimburse the 
loan on time within a year. This unequal distribution of the government fund is partially 
compensated by its redistribution through informal loans within networks of acquaintances. 
However, as those networks are usually small and quite homogeneous, there still exists a 
number of smallholders, acquainted with households as poor as them, with no access to this 
source of credit. 
 
Methodology used in the second ComMod cycle focusing on credit  
According to the villagers’ request to focus on socio-economic constraints to the adoption of 
perennial crops, a complementary farm survey was carried out to gather detailed information 
on these dynamics (credit, off-farm employment and price fluctuations). The RPG and MAS 
model used in the previous cycle were modified to conceive a new set of RPG and MAS 
model adjusted to the villagers’ socio-economic preoccupations. A detailed description of the 
way the RPG and MAS models were adjusted is available in (Barnaud et al. 2007a). Both 
tools were used with villagers during a three day long participatory modelling and simulation 
workshop held in the village school. The objective of this workshop was to stimulate 
exchanges about the credit problem (i) between researchers and local stakeholders (did the 
representation of the situation suggested by the researchers correspond to the villagers’ 
perceptions and preoccupations?), and (ii) among local stakeholders themselves, i.e. among 
the different categories of farming households (what possible collective solutions could be 
found to solve the problem of unequal access to perennial crops?). On the first day, gaming 
sessions with twelve players representing the different types of farming households were 
conducted to stimulate exchanges of perceptions on the problem and discussions about 
possible solutions (figure 2.a). On the second day, individual interviews were conducted to 
elucidate the players’ behaviours during the game, and to assess the model of the game, i.e. to 
let the local stakeholders criticize or validate the researchers’ assumptions on the credit 
situation. The research team had conceived before the workshop a conceptual model 
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formalising their assumptions regarding the farmers’ behaviours and the main interacting 
social and ecological dynamics. This conceptual model had been used to prepare the role-
playing game and to build a temporary version of the associated MAS model. After the first 
two days of the workshop, this temporary MAS model was quickly adapted to take into 
account the new knowledge acquired during the game and the critics of the game made by the 
participants. Then on the third day of the workshop, participatory sessions of simulations with 
this improved and validated MAS model were conducted to explore the scenarios suggested 
by the villagers during the first day discussions (figure 2.b). Later on, this MAS model was 
more thoroughly improved and further simulations were conducted in the lab to analyze 
thoroughly the functioning of the credit system in the model and the scenarios suggested by 
the villagers. 
  
  
Description of the MAS model 
The MAS model was implemented under the CORMAS (Common pool Resources and Multi-
Agent Systems, http://cormas.cirad.fr) simulation platform specifically designed to model 
interactions between ecological and social dynamics for renewable resource management 
(Bousquet et al. 1998). 
 
Modelling assumptions 
There is no process of inheritance because the duration of the simulation does not exceed 15 
years, which was considered sufficient to analyse the dynamic of investment in perennial 
crops. 
 
Model entities and structure 
The model main social agents (farmer, usurer -or loan shark-, government and village funds), 
passive objects (market, weather), and spatial entities (“cell” as the elementary spatial unit on 
the grid, “fields” of various size depending on the farm type, and “farm” made of several 
fields) and their relationships are presented in Figure 3. In this UML class diagram, one can 
see the attributes (variable or permanent characteristics) and methods (possible actions during 
simulations) assigned to each model’s entity.  
 
Figure 2b. An agent-based model, very 
similar the game, is used to explore 
collectively scenarios of solutions suggested 
by the participants. Compare to the game, the 
computer simulations allow to explore more 
various and longer-term scenarios (15 years) 
within a shorter time.    
Figure 2a. Each participant plays the role of 
a farmer managing a set of fields located on a 
gaming board representing a catchment. The 
12 players are given various initial amounts 
of land, labour and capital and can play the 
equivalent of  6 cropping years within a day. 
This stimulates discussions among them 
about their problems.     
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Figure 3. Class diagram of the model describing its entities and their relationships.  
 
Twelve agent farmers (3, 6 and 3 for types A, B, and C respectively) are represented in 
the model, like in the associated RPG. This corresponds to the actual farm distribution in the 
village. In the model, the three types of farmers differ by their initial amounts of land per 
capita and capital resources, as well as the annual family consumption needs (well-off 
families have higher needs than poor ones).   
Each farmer operates with 1, 2 or 3 family labourers which he will decide each year to 
assign either to off-farm or farming activities. This labour constraint was introduced in the 
model to take into account the fact that perennial crops are less labour-intensive than annual 
field crops and allow farmers to seize more off-farm employment opportunities.  
To represent networks of informal credit, each farmer is assigned two acquaintances 
selected among the other agents. 
 
Sequential flow of information during simulation and farmers decision making process 
The time step is the crop year and each simulation is made of 15 time steps, i.e. 15 successive 
crop years. Each year, each agent “Farmer” starts to search credit if needed, i.e. if his 
available cash is not sufficient to pay for the annual agricultural inputs. Each farmer will 
successively try to secure the required loan from the government fund (with zero interest), his 
acquaintances, the village fund, and, as a very last resort, usurers. When a farmer receives a 
loan request from one of his acquaintances, he will accept on the condition that his cash 
available is above a certain threshold. After looking for credit, the farmer decides whether to 
seize off-farm employment opportunities or not. This determines the amount of family labour 
available on the farm. Then each farmer allocates a choice of crops to his fields. All farmers, 
whatever their socio-economic type, have the same decision-making process4. The decision 
making process regarding crop allocation is as follows. The farmer allocates a crop to a field, 
and the corresponding costs of external inputs are deducted from the available cash. Then he 
repeats the same process for all his fields. For the first field, all farmers will decide to grow 
rice for home consumption. This decision does not necessarily correspond to an economic 
optimum. It is rather related to a cultural preference. Then, for the other fields, the decision to 
grow the different types of annual crops is regulated by the cash available to pay for the input 
costs and the amount of family labour available. The decision to invest in perennial crops 
depends only on the capacity for investment, which is a function of the cash available and the 
family basic needs. After these steps, the model simulates for each farmer the harvesting 
                                                 
4 But as the results of these decisions depend on the amount of cash available, farmers belonging to the same 
socioeconomic type usually have similar land-use strategies. 
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period, the clearing of accounts (sale of cash crop products and deduction of the family 
consumption) and proceeds with the reimbursement of the loans to each lender (figure 4). 
When a farmer cannot reimburse a loan secured from the formal credit system, he will request 
credit from acquaintances and usurers. A farmer indebted with usurers assigns all his family 
labour to off-farm activities. If this is not enough to reimburse the loan for three successive 
years, this agent disappears, i.e. he/she is forced to sell his farm land and to leave the village.  
 
Figure 4. Dynamic diagram describing the process of reimbursement by the farmers 
 
Uncertainties 
This model is not a deterministic model. Each simulation will give different outputs. The 
main sources of uncertainties which are formalized with probability rules in the model are the 
following ones: (i) rainfall (which has an incidence on the risk of soil erosion), (ii) cash crop 
prices (random fluctuations within a range which is specific for each crop), (iii) off-farm 
opportunities (uncertainty of the labour market outside the village), and (iv) exceptional 
expenses which do not correspond to “rational” choices (such as the wedding of a child, as the 
social dimension of such an event is so important that even poor families will not hesitate to 
get indebted for it). However, when conducting the simulation experiments, to get more 
accurate results with a reasonable number of simulations, some of these stochastic elements 
such as the price fluctuations were neutralized and replaced by fixed series of numbers.     
  
Outputs and indicators 
Two major indicators were selected to assess the results of the simulations: (i) an agro-
ecological indicator: the area under perennial crops for each of the three farm types (indicator 
for risk of soil erosion: the larger is the area under perennial crops, the lower is the risk of soil 
erosion), and (ii) a socioeconomic indicator: the percentage of type A farming households 
facing bankruptcy and having to leave the village against their will due to indebtedness 
(indicator for socio-economic differentiation through a process of impoverishment of the 
poorer villagers).  
 
Verification and calibration 
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The model verification and calibration were carried out by using a year-by-year monitoring of 
a set of indicators during simulations (crop combination per type of farm, on/off-farm labour 
employment, annual net incomes) and through their qualitative and quantitative comparison 
with the real circumstances recorded during the preliminary farm surveys.  
 
Validation: respective roles of modellers and stakeholders 
The process of validation differs for the entities’ behaviour (local level) and the system’s 
behaviour resulting from the interactions among these entities (global level). Within the 
framework of a project, Moss et al. (2000) defined validation as “the process by means of 
which model users develop confidence that the simulation models accurately capture their 
own assumptions” (p. 4). This is the way we validate the local level entities’ behaviour in the 
model: we observe the farmers while they play to check our own assumptions about their 
behaviours, and we ask the farmers whether the model accurately capture their assumptions 
about their own behaviour and their environment. The game, very similar to its associated 
model, is a useful tool to “open the black box of the model” and to allow them to participate 
in its construction and validation. During the individual interviews following the gaming 
sessions, the players were asked whether some important dynamics related to the problem 
were missing or were not well represented compared to their assumptions about real 
circumstances. If a few suggestions for improvements were made and integrated in the model, 
in particular regarding the calibration of off-farm incomes, most of them found it realistic. 
Moreover, when asked weather they liked playing the game, and why, the most frequent 
answer given by the participants was “I liked playing the game because it is exactly like 
reality”. We could also observe that players were very fast into the game, and this triggered 
lively and pertinent discussions among them about their real situation. According to Duke 
(1974), such observations are the best way to validate a game.   
At the global level, the general properties of the system emerging from the interacting 
entities might capture some of our initial assumptions about the system, what is a form of 
validation. But the model might also reveal unexpected results. The researchers can consider 
these less intuitive emerging properties as new hypothesis on the system, and then look again 
at the real system, eventually discuss these hypotheses with the local stakeholders, and 
validate or reject them.       
 
Identification of scenarios according to stakeholders’ suggestions 
The gaming session revealed the social inequity regarding investments in plantation crops 
because of unequal access to credit. The participants agreed that this situation reflected their 
real circumstances and constituted a problem. This collective agreement stimulated more 
exchanges and the following questions were raised: how to change the rules for formal and 
informal credit so that resource-poor (type A) farmers would have a better access to credit? Is 
it possible to change those rules? Would the smallholders benefit from such a change or 
would they face an even higher risk of bankruptcy? What would be the consequence of such 
changes for the medium-sized and larger landholders (type B and C farmers)? Following a 
lively discussion, they proposed to explore two possible solutions. An old player suggested 
solving the problem through informal credit, i.e. to set up broader and more socially 
heterogeneous networks of acquaintances to allow smallholders who are not yet acquainted 
with some wealthy farmers to get informal credit from them without interest (Figure 5). 
Younger players suggested changing the rules regulating the allocation of formal credit. In the 
current situation, type A farmers do not have access to the government fund, and the grace 
period is one year. These players suggested to introduce a 3 year long grace period (3 years is 
the duration from planting to first harvest of perennial crops in the model), and to allow type 
A farmers to borrow money from this source.  
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Figure 5. The two (S, B) types of social networks among three (A, B, C) main types of 
farms in the village used to regulate the distribution of informal credit. S: small and 
rather homogeneous networks (close to the real circumstances), B: broader and more 
heterogeneous networks. Type A, B and C farmers are respectively small, medium-sized and 
large landholders. 
Six scenarios considered as pertinent to further explore the participants’ suggestions 
were defined based on different combinations among the following three variables (Table 1):  
(i) Duration for the reimbursement of loans secured from the government fund: one or 
three years (1,3), 
(ii) Mode of allocation of formal credit from the government fund among the three 
different types of farms : two main types of distribution are distinguished whether 
this source of credit is accessible to type A farmers or not (A for Access, NA for 
No Access),  
(iii) Configuration of networks of acquaintances for access to informal credit: two 
situations displayed in Figure 5 (S for Small networks, B for Broad networks). 
 
Table 1. Description of the six scenarios to be simulated 
Scenario 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Duration of loans from government fund 
(years) 
1 1 1 3 3 3 
Distribution of loans from government 
fund (A or NA for Access or No Access 
for type A farmers respectively) 
 
Amounts allocated to type A, B and C 
farmers respectively (thousand 
Bahts5/loan) 
 
NA 
 
 
0-10-20 
 
NA 
 
 
0-10-20 
 
A 
 
 
5-8-19 
 
NA 
 
 
0-30-54 
 
A 
 
 
12-18-54 
 
A 
 
 
12-18-54 
Configuration of networks of 
acquaintances  for informal credit (Small 
or Broader, S or B respectively) 
 
S 
 
B 
 
S 
 
S 
 
S 
 
B 
 
Scenario 1 (1, NA, S) is the baseline scenario corresponding to the current situation: it is 
characterized by a 1 year grace period for the loans secured from the government fund, no 
access to this fund for smallholders - type A farmers-, and small and rather homogeneous 
networks of acquaintances (table 1). Scenario 2 (1, NA, B) explore new rules for informal 
credit, and more precisely broader networks of acquaintances. In scenarios 3, 4, and 5, 
networks of acquaintances remain small like in the baseline scenario, and new rules for the 
allocation of formal credit are tested. 
 
                                                 
5 NB: in early 2006, 40 Thai baht= 1 US$. 
A
B B
B C 
C 
A
A
BB B C A 
A 
A 
B B 
B 
B B 
B 
C 
C C
S  B 
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A preliminary exploration of the model allowed us to determine pertinent values for the 
amounts allocated to type A, B and C farmers respectively in the various scenarios (table 1). 
For 1 year long credit, NA distribution corresponds to the actual distribution of the 
government fund in the village, i.e. 0, 10 and 20 thousand Bahts for type A, B and C farmers 
respectively. Two constraints were taken into account to determine other distributions. First, 
we considered that the total budget allocated was fixed. For 3 year-long credit, to take into 
account general interest charges paid by the government, the total budget is slightly inferior to 
an amount equivalent to three times the total budget allocated for 1 year. Second, we 
considered that farmers would be allocated an amount which would not increase their risk of 
bankruptcy compare to current situation, i.e. which they would be able to reimburse in most 
cases. 
 
Results of simulation experiments 
   
Figure 6 displays the results of the simulations of the six selected scenarios. The graph 
displays the area under perennial crops in the 3 types of farm and the percentage of type A 
bankrupt farms at the end of the simulations, i.e. 15 years. 
 
 
Note 1: scenarios are combinations of 3 variables : the duration of government credit (1 or 3 years), its distribution (A or NA 
for Accessible or Not Acessible to type A farmers), and the configuration of acquaintance networks (S or B for Small or 
Broad).  
Note 2: average of the results of 20 repetitions of 15 step-long simulations for each scenario. We acknowledge 
that from a statistic point of view, it would have been preferable to run more than 20 repetitions. But given the 
numerous parameters of the model, it was not possible to conduct an exhaustive experiment plan. We decided 
therefore to neutralize some of the major stochastic elements of the model such as random price fluctuations by 
replacing them by fixed series of numbers, and run several simulations to check qualitatively that the intrinsic 
variability6 of a scenario was sufficiently low to allow comparisons between scenarios.  
                                                                       
Figure 6. Effects of various rules for the allocation of formal and informal credit on the 
adoption of perennial crops and the risk of bankruptcy among different types of farmers  
 
                                                 
6 For the scenario 1, the average areas for type A, B and C are respectively 0.12, 1.18 and 3.11 and the associated 
standard deviations are 0.06, 0.09 and 0.15. 
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The results of scenario 2 suggest that when social networks are broader, i.e. when 
smallholders have more the possibility to borrow money from acquaintances, the number of 
farms going bankrupt in the community is significantly reduced. But the results also suggest 
that this kind of informal credit does not allow these smallholders to increase their capacity to 
invest in plantation crops. This is because farmers borrow money from their acquaintances 
only for urgent needs and not for long-term investments like plantation crops. In scenario 3 (1, 
A, S), type A farmers have access to the government fund, but the duration of the loan 
remains 1 year. As seen in the previous section, the amount of this loan was chosen to be not 
too high to avoid an increase in the risk of bankruptcy because of farmers’ inability to 
reimburse. The results of this scenario suggest that such a loan is not sufficient to allow type 
A farmers to increase significantly their area under plantations. This is because farmers have 
to wait three years before getting the first harvest of their perennial crops– and be able to 
reimburse a loan. In scenarios 4 and 5, the reimbursement period is 3 years. In scenario 4 (3, 
NA, S), type A farmers do not have access to this fund, and the total amount is shared among 
type B and type C farmers only. Results of simulation suggest that a 3 year long credit allows 
type B and C farmers to grow significantly more perennial crops. In scenario 5 (3, A, S), the 
total amount of credit is shared among the 3 types of farmers. This scenario suggests that if 
amounts allocated are not too high (compared to each type of farmer’ reimbursement 
capacity), a credit with a 3 year long grace period allows all types of farmers (including 
smallholders) to grow more perennial crops. Thanks to the higher incomes generated by these 
plantations, the risk of bankruptcy for type A farmers is reduced to less than 15% (against 
almost 50 % in the baseline scenario). However, only broader networks of acquaintances 
reduce completely their risk of bankruptcy, as illustrated by the results of scenario 6 (3, A, B). 
These 6 scenarios illustrate the specific and complementary roles played by formal and 
informal credit. With long duration loans, formal credit is potentially more efficient than 
informal credit to stimulate investment in perennial crops, whereas informal credit is 
potentially more efficient than formal credit to reduce the smallholders’ risk of bankruptcy.  
 
Table 2 provided details about the two types of informal exchanges among agents 
during the simulations, i.e. money borrowed from acquaintances and from usurers.  
 
Table 2. Farmer behaviour regarding informal credit during simulations. 
 
Scenarios  1/NA/S 1/NA/L 3/A/S 3/A/L 
Money borrowed from acquaintances (Bahts) 5119 18526 2934 9657 
(Remaining debts with acquaintances) (Bahts) (4144) (13777) (425) (651) 
Money borrowed from money lenders (Bahts) 3454 0 2974 0 
Note 1: as farmers who cannot reimburse their loans with usurers go to bankrupt, there are no remaining debts with usurers at 
the end of the simulations. Note 2:  scenarios are combinations of 3 variables : the duration of government credit (1 or 3 
years), its distribution (A or NA for Accessible or Not Accessible to type A farmers), and the configuration of acquaintance 
networks (S or B for Small or Broad).                                                                          
 
 Obviously, there are more exchanges among acquaintances in scenarios with broad 
networks of acquaintances than in scenarios with small networks of acquaintances. This result 
was quite intuitive. But less intuitive is that even when formal credit is accessible and adapted 
to all types of farmers, informal credit with acquaintances remains very important. This is 
because farmers easily borrow money from their acquaintances when they need to reimburse 
formal loans. But compare to a situation in which type A farmers do not have access to credit, 
there are much less remaining debts with acquaintances at the end of simulations when formal 
credit is more accessible. This is because under these scenarios, rules of formal credit allowed 
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farmers to invest in perennial crops: they were able to reimburse their debts to their 
acquaintances thanks to the higher incomes from their plantations. However, it would be too 
simple to conclude that the suggested new rule of allocation of formal credit is the “best” 
solution. Indeed, indebtedness with usurers remains significant in scenario (3/A/S) and can 
only be reduced through broader networks of acquaintances. This confirms that formal and 
informal forms of credit play specific and complementary roles and should be jointly taken 
into account and analyzed when analyzing credit policies.  
 
Discussion 
Two questions are discussed in this section. First, what are the potential and limits of bottom-
up models such as MAS to explore the functioning of agricultural systems, in particular farm 
differentiation and rural credit dynamics? Second, what are the potential and limits of MAS 
models to support a bottom-up modelling approach, i.e. a participatory modelling process in 
which models are conceived and used with and for local stakeholders?  
 
A bottom-up model to analyze farm differentiation and rural credit 
MAS and farm differentiation 
Researchers in the field of agricultural economics have long been interested in heterogeneity 
among farms and have developed various methods to build farm typologies (Landais 1998). 
Such typologies provide a framework to analyse agricultural systems and to suggest solutions 
adapted to the different types of farmers who have different agro-ecological and socio-
economic means, constraints and strategies. Temporal dimensions are also taken into account 
to understand the processes of farm differentiation which are at the origin of the observed 
heterogeneity among farmers. Several simulation models were developed based on these 
frameworks. Most of them serve to assess the effects of various policies (price changes, 
subsidies, etc.) on the production system, often by maximising an economic function such as 
income through linear programming, as for example in (Dorward 1996). According to 
Landais (1998), these simulations have two major limitations. First they implicitly assume 
that the courses of evolution of the different farm types are independent of each other, and 
consequently overlook interactions such as commercial competition, competition for land, 
information circulation, etc. Second, the spatial dimension is not integrated despite its 
importance in the analysis of agricultural systems. With the recent wide spreading use of 
multi-agents systems, some researchers in agricultural economics start to use such models to 
address these pitfalls (Balmann 2000, Balmann et al. 2002, Berger 2001, Berger et al. 2006, le 
Canh et al. 2005). These researchers also chose MAS for their ability to integrate agro-
ecological and socio-economic factors and developed MAS models representing 
comprehensively some regional agricultural systems. Agricultural economics is indeed an 
interdisciplinary research field by its nature. In these models, farmers are given various initial 
amounts of resources (land, animal, labour, capital) and can interact with each other, mainly 
on a land market in the case of Balmann (2000) and also for exchanges of water and diffusion 
of innovations in the case of Berger (2001). These authors observe structural changes, i.e. 
processes of socio-economic farm differentiation, under various policy scenarios. Based on a 
more or less similar framework of analysis of agricultural systems, the model presented in this 
paper share some similarities with their models.  Farm differentiation is also at the core of our 
analysis, captured in the indicator of the percentage of poor farmers facing bankruptcy and 
having to leave the village against their will due to indebtedness. We show that informal loans 
among farmers within networks of acquaintance play a key role in this process of farm 
differentiation. Only “bottom-up” models such as MAS simulating interactions among 
heterogeneous entities could highlight such results. As Balmann et al. (2002) and Berger 
(2001), we emphasize the promising nature of MAS to bring new perspectives in the field of 
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agricultural economics. But there are differences between the models developed by these 
authors and the one presented in this paper. First their models are deterministic while ours is 
stochastic to trigger the uncertain and unpredictable nature of complex systems. nature take 
into account uncertainties of complex systems. are stochastic As their models are based on 
linear programming, they are deterministic while The main one is that their models based on 
linear programming while ours areare deterministic and assume that farmers’ decision making 
processes are driven by economic optimisation. Our model is stochastic and the model for 
farmers’ decision making processes is based on real behaviours observed during the game, 
and validated through individual interviews with participants following the game. 
uncertainties of the differences is the level of complexity. Balmann (2000) concedes that the 
validation of such models is difficult and limited because of the too numerous factors 
interacting during a simulation. Researchers using the ComMod approach usually recommend 
keeping models as simple as possible to facilitate its validation (which remains a critical task 
anyway) and to make it more accessible to local stakeholders.  
 
MAS and analysis of rural credit 
Stating that in developing countries, informal credit sector did not disappear despite the 
development of formal credit sector, Bell (1990) first suggested a formal model analyzing the 
interactions between formal and informal credit sectors. Later on, several economists 
developed computable general equilibrium (CGE) models to analyze these interactions, all of 
them based on neoclassical economics assumptions (Bose 1998, Gupta and Chaudhuri 1997, 
Jain 1999). In these models, informal credit is restricted to exchange of money between 
usurers and farmers, usurers acting as intermediaries between banks and farmers who do not 
have access to formal credit resources. These authors demonstrate for example that the 
interest rates of formal and informal sectors are closely dependant and influence the co-
evolution of both sectors. Empirical observations from Coleman (2006) in north-east Thailand 
revealed that even pro-poor credit programs were often monopolized by rich usurers who then 
redistributed loans to poor farmers with higher interest rates. Our model also highlights some 
forms of interdependence and coexistence of formal and informal sectors. We show that if 
formal credit is more accessible but not adapted to smallholders (too high loans or too short 
reimbursement period), the number of usury contracts and the amounts of usurers loans 
sharply increase. But if formal credit is more accessible and adapted to smallholders, usury 
contracts decrease in number and amount. They do not disappear however because farmers 
still need to borrow money from usurers when they cannot reimburse formal loans on time. 
Having recourse to usurers is a way to compensate the rigidity of formal credit. But beside 
these results, our MAS model allows us to analyse another key aspect of informal credit 
which CGE models cannot grasp, that is informal exchanges of money among farmers within 
networks of acquaintances. And yet we show that such networks are major determinants of 
socio-economic differentiation among farmers: larger and more homogeneous networks of 
acquaintances significantly reduce the smallholders’ risks of bankruptcy. This result is 
interesting because it is a key assumption which led to the development of micro-credit, an 
approach that has met with wide-spread acceptance. Micro-credit rests on the idea of loaning 
very small amounts of money to the poor and to organize borrowers into small groups of 
people who stand as guarantors for each other. Several MAS modellers come to the same type 
of conclusions regarding the positive role of social networks. Barreteau and Bousquet (2000) 
developed a multi-agent model representing irrigated systems in Senegal and emphasized  the 
key role of exchanges of water and credit within social networks in the viability of this 
irrigated systems. Berger (2001) and Le Canh et al. (2005) who modelled exchanges of 
information about agricultural innovations among farmers suggested that wider social 
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networks reduce socio-economic differentiation among farmers. All these examples illustrate 
the importance of social capital in the evolution of agricultural systems.  
 
A bottom-up modelling approach to accompany local stakeholders’ learning process 
The RPG and MAS simulation tools stimulated a collective learning process among the 
villagers: they could better understand the complex situation at stake, what allowed them to 
suggest and explore scenarios for the management of rural credit that took into account both 
formal and informal sources, trade-offs between socio-economic & ecological objectives, as 
well as equity issues among their heterogeneous farming community. After the workshop, 
villagers told us that requests for the establishment of a three year long grace period on loans 
from the government fund had actually already been sent to the government authorities by 
many rural communities across the country. "If tomorrow the government agrees to lend us 
money for three years, we would have to adapt rapidly to the new situation and these tools 
could be helpful" said a villager. During the interviews following the workshop, the 
participants mentioned two main benefits of the ComMod approach: they said it “helped to 
think ahead” and “to think together”. “In our every daily life we do not have such 
opportunities”, said a participant. Further analysis of the effects of the collective learning  
process stimulated by ComMod in terms of modified perceptions and interactions is available 
in (Barnaud et al 2006b). In the present article, we would like to emphasize that such a use of 
social simulations with and for local stakeholders has two major implications: first, the model 
should be well understood by them; second it should be constantly adapted to their 
preoccupations.  
 
Genuine understanding of the model by the local stakeholders 
This is necessary to ensure that local stakeholders are able to participate to the construction of 
the model through their critics and suggestions. Local stakeholders should also be aware of 
the limits of the models. They should not view the results of MAS simulations as quantitative 
predictions of the future. Instead, the model should be seen as a support to collectively discuss 
possible options before any technical decision is considered. Several factors favour such an 
understanding. The first one is the very nature of multi-agent systems which provide a natural 
and intuitive description of a system in terms of agents, objects and environment instead of 
mathematical equations. Moreover, in the ComMod approach, the associated RPG is a key 
tool to ensure that the model and, more importantly, its limits, are well-understood by the 
local stakeholders. Finally, the most useful models are not necessary the most comprehensive 
and sophisticated ones. Keeping models as simple as possible seems to favour their 
appropriation by their potential users.  
 
Adaptation of the model to local stakeholders’ needs and perceptions  
Second, to increase the usefulness of these social simulations to local stakeholders, the models 
(the RPG as well as the computerized ones) need to be constantly updated and adapted to their 
representations and evolving preoccupations during the companion modelling process. Two 
time scales are distinguished in this process of adaptation of the model to the requirements of 
the users. Within a ComMod cycle, participants are asked whether the model fits to their 
representation of the problem at stake and the model is modified accordingly. From a 
Commod cycle to a following one, the use of a model by users stimulates discussions and 
might raise new questions. A new model is then built to fit to these emerging preoccupations. 
Each model is seen as a subjective extraction of the key relevant dynamics of the system at a 
particular moment of a collective learning process among a particular set of stakeholders with 
specific needs and expectations. Such an adaptive co-construction of the models with 
stakeholders implies modellers’ willingness to adjust them to stakeholders’ changing 
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preoccupations, and the choice of very open and flexible modelling processes and tools. 
Multi-agent systems are particularly appropriate to respond to these needs as they offer the 
possibility to add or delete agents or to modify the model features and object behaviour 
without having to rebuild the whole model. 
 
Questions raised by such a bottom-up modelling approach  
This way to approach the notion of “model” raises questions such as: what would be the 
scientific status of a false model approved by the stakeholders? A first empirical way to 
answer to this question is to observe that among the numerous ComMod experiments 
conducted during the past 6-7 years in different regions of the world, such a situation never 
occurred. From a theoretical point of view, this empirical observation is not really surprising 
because one of the hypotheses of participatory approaches is precisely that all stakeholders 
have their reasons to act the way they act, and that the role of the scientist is to understand 
these reasons. However, the researchers should have a critical analysis of these reasons. If the 
risk to build a “false” model exists, it probably comes from the risk of manipulation of the 
modelling process by some powerful local stakeholders, or the risk to build a model that 
doesn’t include the perceptions of the voiceless people. Further elaboration on the 
differentiated ability, and will, of the various local stakeholders to genuinely participate in the 
modelling process can be found in (Barnaud et al. 2006b).  
 
Conclusion 
Multi-agent systems open new modelling and analysis perspectives in several fields, such as 
social sciences, economics, environmental sciences and, more importantly, at their 
interactions. In the modelling approach adopted in this case study, the MAS model is co-
constructed and used with and for local stakeholders facing a common renewable resource 
management problem. The objective of this approach named Companion Modelling 
(ComMod) is to facilitate collective learning between researchers and local stakeholders, and 
among local stakeholders themselves. Combining the use of MAS models with Role-Playing 
Games (RPG), this experiment aimed to facilitate collective decision-making about the local 
rules for the allocation of rural credit in a socially heterogeneous community of small farmers 
in mountainous northern Thailand. This paper presents the results of a series of simulations 
exploring the ecological, social and economic effects of various rules for formal and informal 
credit suggested by the villagers-participants.  
Drawing on this case study, this paper first elaborates on the potential of bottom-up 
models such as MAS to analyze the functioning of agricultural systems, in particular farm 
differentiation and rural credit dynamics. First, because of the emphasis on interactions 
between social agents and their environment, MAS offer a framework to explore interactions 
between economic and ecological dynamics and to assess the trade-offs between both for 
various scenarios. This is a key dimension for sustainable development. The MAS model 
presented in this paper explored the effects of rural credit on soil erosion and farm 
differentiation. Second, MAS allow us to take into account interactions among individuals in 
the analysis of the functioning of the systems under study. This characteristic is even more 
MAS-specific than the previous one. We demonstrated in this paper that informal exchanges 
of money among farmers in the community significantly reduced the risks of bankruptcy for 
smallholders. MAS open new perspectives in the analysis of agricultural systems as they 
permit to introduce an overlooked but nevertheless fundamental aspect of these systems, i.e. 
social capital. Social capital refers to social relationships, norms and institutions. This notion 
allows to understand some behaviours considered as non-rational in conventional theory: for 
example an actor might take a decision which is not optimizing his income (like lending 
money to an acquaintance with no interest), but which fosters stable relationships or improve 
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his reputation. At the macro-level, social capital is more and more considered as a key 
favouring factor for social equity and ecological sustainability (Rudd 2000). From a 
theoretical point of view, these findings confirm that conventional economic theories are not 
adapted to capture such nuances of complex ecological and economics systems (Arthur 1991, 
Arthur et al. 1997, Tesfatsion and Judd, 2006). To analyse the role of fundamental dynamics 
such as social capital, individuals should not be considered self-regarding and isolated and the 
behaviour of a group of individuals should not be represented by a single average meta-actor 
like in classical economic thinking. Instead, theories and methodologies should be developed 
to go beyond the traditional Homo Economicus (Jager et al 2000, Gintis 2000) and to analyse 
the effects at the macro-level of the interactions among heterogeneous actors at the micro-
level (Kirman 1999).  
In this experiment, MAS are used not only to analyse interactions among social actors, 
but also to stimulate such interactions to facilitate collective learning. This is the second 
question addressed in this paper: what are the potential and limits of MAS models to support a 
bottom-up modelling approach, i.e. a participatory modelling process in which models are 
conceived and used with and for local stakeholders? This experiment suggests that the 
usefulness of models relies much more on the modelling process than on the model itself, 
because a model is usually useless if it is misunderstood by its potential users, or if it does not 
respond to their current preoccupations. Two characteristics of MAS models favour such an 
appropriation by local stakeholders. First, they provide a natural and intuitive description of a 
system, representing the different stakeholders, their behaviour and their environment instead 
of mathematical equations. In the ComMod approach, this is reinforced by the association of 
the MAS with the RPG which is a way to open the black box of the model. Second, MAS 
offer a very flexible modelling framework which enables researchers to adapt rapidly the 
model to local stakeholders’ representations and preoccupations. But the “one size fits all 
model” doesn’t exist. And the use of MAS models described in this article has its own limits. 
The model is here seen as a support for collective discussions about possible options before 
any technical decision is considered. After such a brainstorming stage, if stakeholders need 
tools to quantitatively assess some specific infrastructures for example, other complementary 
kinds of models (MAS or other) might be necessary.  
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